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ABSTRACT
This Article discusses two important facets of Military Regulation and veterans law.
First, this Article explores how the Uniform Code of Military Justice treats veterans
accused of committing self-injury. Thus, there is a prohibition on, including criminal
prosecution of, attempted suicide, which this Article argues exacerbates the issues
which many of our brave servicemen and women face upon returning home from
combat, often carrying the burden of mental disorders such as post-traumatic stress
disorder. Second, this Article delves into Air Force Regulations, which prohibits
termination, without cause, once an officer reaches the rank of Major and has served
at least fourteen years. Despite this codified prohibition, the Air Force has been
terminating these individuals, without cause, and denying them their accrued
retirement benefits. This Article argues that this practice is at best prohibited by
Military Regulation and at worst unconstitutional.
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I. INTRODUCTION1

I

t is not surprising that military troops returning from Iraq and
Afghanistan encounter reintegration challenges, which can range
from suffering with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), discovering that they have been the victim of identity theft, or
facing illegal home foreclosures.
Unfortunately, many of these problems are unavoidable and are the
predictable result of lengthy deployments abroad. However, what is
avoidable is the Military’s response. The Military, itself, is the
architect of many significant problems that service members face
because of its unusual interpretations of Military Regulations. The
Military interprets its regulations to prejudice service members.
This Article discusses and analyzes two policy areas in which the
Military has embraced statutory or regulatory interpretations that harm
and prejudice its members. The first policy area, analyzed below in
Part II, governs the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s criminal
prohibitions on “wrongful” self-injury. The Article explains and
discusses instances in which the Military has prosecuted sick and
suicidal soldiers, who are often suffering with post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), for the crime of attempting suicide.2
The second policy area, discussed below in Part III, governs the
Air Force’s treatment of service members who are within six years of
retirement and who are protected by Federal Law and Military
Regulations from termination without cause once they reach the rank
of Major and have served at least fourteen years. The Air Force,
contrary to its own Regulations and to the Department of Defense
Instructions, has terminated Airmen with fourteen years in service and
denied them retirement benefits. These terminations not only prejudice
service members, but may also violate the U.S. Constitutional

1

2

The AMVETS Legal Clinic, at Chapman University, provides pro bono
representation to service members and their families. The discussion and
analysis in this Article originate from actual cases, which are now being litigated
by Post Doctoral Fellows, and Faculty, in the AMVETS Legal Clinic. For more
information about the AMVETS Legal Clinic, see Law Scribbler: Chapman
University Legal Clinic Does Double Duty, A.B.A. J., 21 (Feb. 2013).
This section of the Article [Part II] is adapted and excerpted from Ari Freilich,
Fallen Soldier: Military (In)justice and the Criminalization of Attempted Suicide
After U.S. v. Caldwell, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 74 (2014).
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provisions protecting property rights and guaranteeing procedural due
process.3
II. THE MILITARY’S POLICY OF CRIMINALIZING ATTEMPTED
SUICIDE EXACERBATES THE MILITARY’S SUICIDE EPIDEMIC4
A U.S. Army soldier was more likely to die by suicide last year
than from combat, accidents, or illness. Military suicide rates climbed
to an all-time high as the Pentagon scrambled for answers to stem the
tide. But amid this deadly “suicide epidemic,” the Military has clung
to an outdated, cruel, and damaging policy of criminalizing suicide
attempts and self-injury. This means that the 3500 service members
who survived attempted suicide last year may still face years of jail
time for succumbing to mental injury and disease.
The Military’s numbers tell a tragic story. In July 2012, Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta declared in testimony to Congress that a
“suicide epidemic” was afflicting the Armed Forces.5 “‘Something,’ he
said, ‘is wrong.’” 6 A record 350 active duty service members took
their own lives that year, more than double the number from ten years
before.7 Army suicide rates doubled even faster, in a span of just five
years, to become the leading cause of death among Army forces. 8
Across all the services, hundreds more died of suicide this decade than
in twelve bloody years of war in Afghanistan.9
3

4
5

6
7

8

9

This topic is explored and discussed more fully in Josh Flynn-Brown, Analyzing
the Tension between Military Force Reductions and the Constitution: Protecting
an Officer’s Property Interest in Continued Employment, 46 SUFFOLK L. REV.
1067 (2013).
This section of the Article is adapted and excerpted from Freilich, supra note 2.
See Kathleen Miller, Military Faces Suicide ‘Epidemic,’ Panetta Tells Congress,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jul. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0725/Military-faces-suicide-epidemic-panetta-tells-u-s-lawmakers.html.
Id.
See James Dao & Andrew W. Lehren, Baffling Rise in Suicides Plagues the U.S.
Military, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16
/us/baffling-rise-in-suicides-plagues-us-military.html.
Anna Mulrine, Suicide ‘Epidemic’ in Army: July was Worst Month, Pentagon
Says, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.csmonitor
.com/USA/Military/2012/0817/Suicide-epidemic-in-Army-July-was-worstmonth-Pentagon-says.
See IRAQ COALITION CASUALTY COUNT, Afghanistan Coalition Military
Fatalities by Year, http://icasualties.org/ (last visited May 8, 2014).
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The Military’s attempted suicide rate is even higher. The
Department of Defense Suicide Prevention Office estimates that for
every active duty suicide, 10 more active duty service members
attempt to take their lives each year; at least half of those have to be
hospitalized for their self-injuries.10 A Defense Department survey of
nearly 30,000 active duty service members from every branch revealed
that a staggering 2% of Army, 2.3% of Marines, and 3% of Navy
respondents had attempted suicide at some point in their careers.11 In
addition, the Pentagon estimated that 950 veterans under VA care
attempted suicide each month between October 2008 and December
2010.12
This tide of suicides has baffled the Military 13 because,
historically, the Military’s suicide rate was significantly lower than the
civilian rate.14 Military suicide rates began trending upward in 2004
and crested above the national average in 2008.15 Along with rising
suicide rates, diagnosed cases of PTSD have increased steadily in the
Military since 2003.16 More than one in five veterans of the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars have now been diagnosed with PTSD, more than
300,000 men and women in total. 17 Their mental injury from war,
PTSD, is “strongly linked to suicidal behavior and it is a major
predictor of who transitions from suicidal ideation to attempting
suicide.”18 Military physicians have also documented a rising trend in
10

11
12
13
14
15
16

17

18

DEFENSE SUICIDE PREVENTION OFFICE, Section on Facts About Suicide,
http://www.suicideoutreach.org/about_suicide.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2014)
[hereinafter DEFENSE SUICIDE PREVENTION OFFICE].
Id.
Mulrine, supra note 8.
See Dao & Lehren, supra note 7.
DEFENSE SUICIDE PREVENTION OFFICE, supra note 10.
Id.
See FACE THE FACTS USA, Shocking PTSD, Suicide Rates for Vets (Jun. 6,
2013), http://www.facethefactsusa.org/facts/the-true-price-of-war-in-human-ter
ms/.
Charles W. Hoge et al., Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health
Problems, and Barriers to Care, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 13 (2004).
E.A. Selby et al, Overcoming the Fear of Lethal Injury: Evaluating Suicidal
Behavior in the Military through the Lens of the Interpersonal—Psychological
Theory of Suicide, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 298, 301 (2010); William
Hudenko & Tina Crenshaw, The Relationship Between PTSD and Suicide,
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS NATIONAL CENTER FOR PTSD,
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non-suicidal self-injuries, like habitual self-cutting, attributed to “long,
repeated combat tours” and “strong feelings of desperation.”19
However, while the Military has acknowledged this growing
suicide epidemic and taken steps to ameliorate the problem, it has left
in place cruel and archaic regulations that punish service members
who survive attempted suicide. It has continued to involuntarily
separate or prosecute its sick and injured under criminal codes—
Articles 115 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ)—that penalize attempted suicide and self-injury. Article 115
criminalizes “malingering,” which includes “intentional infliction of
self-injury for the purpose of avoiding work, duty, or service.” 20
Article 134, called “the general article,” is an extraordinarily broad and
unusual catch-all, criminalizing “all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the Armed Forces” and “all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces.”21 The
Manual for Courts-Martial lists “self-injury without intent to avoid
service” as a paradigmatic example of conduct punishable under this
code. 22 Military courts have continued to interpret those criminal
statutes very broadly up to the present day.
A. Civilian Courts’ Modern Consensus
The legal history of suicide demonstrates that military justice has
fallen woefully out of step with developments in civilian courts in this
area. Most American civilian jurisdictions decriminalized attempted
suicide by the end of the horse and buggy era.23 Over fifty years ago,
the Model Penal Code’s drafters wrote, “We think it clear that
[attempted suicide] is not an area in which the penal law can be
effective and that its intrusion on such tragedies is an abuse.”24 The

19

20
21
22

23

24

http://archive.is/UbO2 (last visited May 8, 2014) (citing studies that find a
“robust relationship” between PTSD and suicide).
PATRICIA A. ADLER, THE TENDER CUT: INSIDE THE HIDDEN WORLD OF SELFINJURY 37 (2011).
10 U.S.C. § 915 (2012).
10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012).
See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES IV-60 (2008), available at
http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/mcm2008.pdf.
See Thomas J. Marzen et al., “Suicide: A Constitutional Right?”—Reflections
Eleven Years Later, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 261, 264 (1996).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5 cmt. at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
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drafters also rejected the criminalization of non-suicidal self-injury.25
Subsequent Model Penal Code drafters went even further declaring
that:
[C]riminal punishment is singularly inefficacious to deter attempts
to commit suicide . . . . It seems preposterous to argue that the
visitation of criminal sanctions upon one who fails in the effort is
likely to inhibit persons from undertaking a serious attempt to take
their own lives . . . . There is a certain moral extravagance in imposing
criminal punishment on a person who has sought his own selfdestruction, who has not attempted direct injury to anyone else, and
who more properly requires medical or psychiatric attention.26
No American jurisdiction has criminally punished a suicide
attempt since 1961, 27 and today no state has any law criminalizing
attempted suicide. 28 As the California Supreme Court wrote thirty
years ago, “[A]ll modern research points to one conclusion about the
problem of suicide—the irrelevance of the criminal law to its
solution.” 29 This, the Federal Ninth Circuit said, is “the modern
consensus” in this area.30
B. Military Courts’ Anachronistic Approach
However, the modern Military has not adopted that consensus and
has continued to criminalize self-injury. After the adoption of the
UCMJ in 1951, military courts were initially hostile to the notion of
punishing the suicidal, even though military law had long punished
self-injury as a violation of the “general article.”31 In the 1955 case of
25

26

27

28
29

30
31

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1985) (defining “assault” to include both
assault and battery, where one “attempts to cause or purposefully, knowingly, or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another”) (emphasis added).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. at 2 (Official Draft & Revised Commentaries
1980).
Id.; Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 859 n.14 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Research indicates that the last prosecution in the U.S. for attempted suicide
probably occurred in 1961. The North Carolina Supreme Court relied on the
English common law to determine that attempted suicide was punishable as a
misdemeanor.”) (citing State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961)).
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810.
In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 434 (1983) (quoting David S. Markson, The
Punishment of Suicide, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 473 (1969)).
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 847.
Capt. Richard L. Dunn, USAF, Aspects of Malingering, 17 A.F. L. REV. 1, 2
(1975).
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United States v. Jacobs, for example, the Army Board of Review held
that “intentional self-injury,” without more, was not a cognizable
offense under military law. 32 The Board required an additional
showing that a service member’s self-injury actually impaired his
ability to perform military duties in order to justify criminal
punishment.33
The Air Force Court of Military Review followed that same
approach one week later in United States v. Walker and explicitly
invalidated prosecutions for attempted suicide where there was no
proof of fraudulent intent. 34 In that case, the accused had been
convicted of “wrongfully and willfully attempting to commit suicide”
under Article 134 after he consumed 100 sleeping pills. 35 Like the
Army board in Jacobs, the Walker court concluded that “attempted
suicide” was not, without more, a cognizable offense under military
law.36 The court attempted to limit commands’ unfettered discretion to
prosecute crimes under Article 134, holding that courts “cannot grant
to the services unlimited authority to eliminate vital elements from . . .
offenses expressly defined by Congress and permit the remaining
elements to be punished as an offense under [the general article].”37
After the Walker case, no further prosecutions of attempted suicide
cases were reported for over a decade.38
However, this measured approach did not hold. In the 1968 case of
United States v. Taylor, the Military’s highest court signaled a serious
shift when it approved the Article 134 conviction of a Seaman Recruit
who superficially slashed his arms with a razor blade in order to
“outdo the performance” of another serviceman who had engaged in
the same conduct.39 Though the Government never alleged that Taylor
had intended to evade military duty through this act —or that he had
genuinely attempted suicide— the U.S. Court of Military Appeals
declared that the accused’s mental state and purpose were essentially
irrelevant in Article 134 prosecutions. The court held that Article 134
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

United States v. Jacobs, 20 C.M.R. 458, 460 (A.B.R. 1955).
Dunn, supra note 31, at 5.
Id. at 343.
United States v. Walker, 20 C.M.R. 931, 933 (A.B.R.. 1955).
Id. at 934.
Id. at 935.
Dunn, supra note 31, at 5.
U.S. v. Taylor, 38 C.M.R. 393, 395 (C.M.A. 1968).
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had “an objective orientation . . . calculated to preserve good order and
discipline, without necessarily considering [the accused’s] particular
mental attitude.”40 Therefore, so long as the accused’s self-injury had a
direct prejudicial effect upon the good order and discipline of the
Armed Forces, he could be prosecuted for self-injury whether his
purpose was wrongful or not.41 Where government prosecutors lacked
sufficient evidence to charge the suicidal under Article 115 as dutyshirking malingerers, now they could cite the external effects of a
failed suicide attempt to prosecute and punish the mentally ill and
injured.
The Court of Military Appeals faced just that situation in United
States v. Ramsey, where the court, citing Taylor, upheld the Article
134 conviction of an Army Specialist who shot himself in the shoulder
while serving in Operation Desert Storm.42 Ramsey was arguably not
genuinely suicidal. He had shot himself with a single round in a
nonlethal area just after arriving in a combat zone, and his explanation
for that conduct shifted multiple times.43 However, the Ramsey court
conducted no inquiry into Ramsey’s intent and sanctioned criminal
punishment under Article 134 on the premise that he was in fact
genuinely suicidal. 44 Because Ramsey admitted that his suicide
attempt “killed the morale of his unit” and made his colleagues “work
a little harder to try to fill the position that he was supposed to be
filling,” the court ruled that he could be punished criminally for
prejudicing good order and discipline.45 The Ramsey court established
a notably low bar for criminal prosecution. Commanders could allege
that almost any suicide attempt affected the morale of those who knew
and nearly lost a friend and colleague; moreover, treatment and
hospitalization for survivors would leave duty stations temporarily
unfilled. News that a service member had come down with measles or
survived a car wreck might have the same prejudicial effect. In sum,
these cases indicated that under Article 134, attempted suicide was
increasingly looking like a strict liability offense.

40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 395.
Id.
U.S. v. Ramsey, 40 M.J. 71, 75 (C.M.A. 1994).
Id. at 72.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 74.
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In United States v. Johnson, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals
vastly broadened the scope of self-injuries punishable under Article
115, as well. The Johnson court approved the Article 115 prosecution
of an Army Staff Sergeant who, to avoid facing a possible courtmartial trial on other charges, attempted to hang himself while
injecting a near-fatal dose of heroin.46 The court accepted Johnson’s
suicide attempt as genuine but held that he could be prosecuted for
fraudulently attempting to avoid work, duty, or service because he
admitted that he attempted suicide in order to avoid the shame and
embarrassment of a possible trial. 47 The court stated that Johnson’s
work, duty, and service included his “availability for prosecution” by
military authorities. 48 Thus, his desire to escape that general
“availability” amounted to criminally punishable duty-shirking.
“Usually attempts to commit suicide are not thought of in connection
with malingering,” the court acknowledged. Commenting further, the
court stated:
Probably this is because malingering has often been a tactic
employed to extend, rather than shorten, life expectancy—and
especially so in a combat situation. However, we perceive nothing in
the definition of malingering which precludes prosecution for
attempted suicide if the ‘purpose’ of the attempt is avoidance of ‘duty
or service.’49
The court cited approvingly even broader language from its earlier
opinion in United States v. Mamaluy, stating that Article 115
“unquestionably . . . intended to proscribe a self-inflicted injury which
would prevent the injured party from being available for the
performance of all military tasks.” 50 The Mamaluy court had found
that a suicidal service member’s hospitalization, itself, was proof of
the service member’s purpose to shirk military duty: “If by injuring
himself he forces the Government to confine him in a hospital, he has
breached his obligation to the service and successfully escaped the
performance of many [m]ilitary duties assigned.”51

46
47
48
49
50
51

United States. v. Johnson, 26 M.J. 415, 417 (C.M.A. 1988).
Id.
Id at 417.
Id.
United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 178 (1959) (emphasis added).
Id.
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C. The Military’s Highest Court Punts in U.S. v. Caldwell
In July 2012, the same month the Defense Department declared
that a “suicide epidemic” afflicted the Armed Forces,52 the Military’s
highest court granted review of the following question in United States
v. Caldwell: whether a bona fide suicide attempt remained criminally
punishable under military law. 53 Two years earlier, Marine Corps
Private Lazzaric Caldwell was convicted at special court-martial
pursuant to his guilty plea on a charge of “wrongful self-injury” under
Article 134, for slitting his wrists in “a genuine suicide attempt.”54 The
trial judge acknowledged that the self-injury offense was an “odd
charge because . . . it is basically criminalizing an attempted
suicide,” 55 but he approved a court-martial sentence that included
confinement for six months and a punitive misconduct discharge, 56
despite evidence that the Marine suffered diagnosed depression and
PTSD.57
Though the Caldwell court’s April 2013 opinion narrowly rejected
a strict liability interpretation of Article 134’s self-injury prohibition
and vacated Private Caldwell’s conviction, the court dodged the
central question before it and declined to invalidate criminal
prosecution of the suicidal.58 Alarmingly, the minority’s view that a
depressed and suicidal veteran may be imprisoned for causing medical
personnel to expend resources to save him lost by just a single vote.59
D. The Tragic Effects of the Military’s Criminal Suicide Policy
In most respects, the modern Military has recently begun to
approach suicide with informed compassion, recognizing that
treatment is the best deterrent. It has initiated more than 900 suicide
prevention programs and anti-stigma campaigns to promote mental

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

See Miller, supra note 5.
United States v. Caldwell, 72 M.J. 137, 138 (C.A.A.F 2013).
Id.
Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
Id.
See id. at 145 & n.3 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 138 (majority opinion).
Id. at 142 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (stating that the court overstepped its bounds by
not enforcing strict liability).

2014

Self-Inflicted Wounds

433

health care, 60 especially for the 300,000 veterans of Iraq and
Afghanistan who have already been diagnosed with PTSD. 61 The
Army’s Suicide Prevention Strategy in 2012 called for “safe and
positive messages addressing mental illness and suicide . . . to help
reduce prejudice and promote help seeking.”62
But the Military is marching forward with one foot and backward
with the other. Criminal prosecutions for attempted suicide and selfinjury made many of the Military’s therapeutic efforts ineffective and
exacerbated this tragic problem. The Military’s “safe and positive
messages” addressing suicide obviously fall on deaf ears when they
are still joined with the unmistakable threat of criminal punishment.
While a soldier injured by shrapnel blast has no reason to fear
punishment for his wound of war, his PTSD-stricken comrade-in-arms
is likely confessing to a crime when he tells his psychiatrist about his
suicidal behavior. After he admits to suicidal conduct, his psychiatrist,
according to Military Regulations, would be compelled to stop the
session on the spot to warn her patient of his rights against selfincrimination under Article 31. 63 The psychiatrist’s subsequent
questions about her patient’s suicidal ideation and intent would be an
essential part of the diagnostic process and would be crucial to arriving
at a prescribed course of treatment, therapy, and rehabilitation.
However, those same questions would be indistinguishable from
Military Police interrogators’ and might be used against the
serviceman in a criminal court-martial. 64 Because health record
privacy protections do not apply to the suicidal, that admission could
be shared with his command and used against him at trial.65 Without
60

61
62
63

64

65

See THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE: STRENGTHENING THE FORCE,
PREVENTING SUICIDE, AND SAVING LIVES: FINAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS OF THE
ARMED FORCES 42 (2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA529502.
See Hoge et al., supra note 17, at 13.
Id.
See United States. v. Calandrino, 12 C.M.R. 689, 692–95 (A.F.B.R. 1953)
(stating that a psychiatrist who suspected his patient of malingering should have
warned him of his testimonial rights prior to initiating the interview).
See id. at 689 (“Accordingly, the accused became ‘a person suspected of an
offense’ within the meaning of UCMJ, Art 31, during the first interview and
compliance with the cited article was required.”).
See 32 C.F.R. § 637.9 (“Medical records will remain under the control of the
records custodian who will make them available for courts-martial or other legal
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the hassle of a trial, the Military could also dishonorably discharge
him, denying him access to the medical and mental health care he
desperately needs.
No wonder so many choose to suffer in silence.
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE AIR FORCE’S AD-HOC REDUCTION
66
IN FORCE POLICIES
While criminalizing suicide is an unusually bizarre example of the
Military interpreting its own provisions to the detriment of service
members, unfortunately it is not an isolated one. This section discusses
another example in which the Military failed to follow its own explicit
regulations, which resulted in the unjust and unlawful termination of
157 Air Force Officers.
In November 2011, the U.S. Air Force terminated 157 Air Force
Officers who had been promoted to Major and had served at least
fourteen years on active duty.67 The Air Force had not selected them
for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel; however, under Air Force
Regulations, Department of Defense Policy, and Federal Law, that
lone fact should not have led to their termination.68 Federal Law and
Military Regulations allow officers to remain in military service even
if they were not selected for promotion to the next highest rank, so
long as they have achieved the rank of Major, have completed at least
fourteen years of military service, and do not have derogatory
information in their personnel files.69 Derogatory information includes
things like conviction of crimes (such as driving under the influence)

66
67

68

69

69

proceedings. Procedures for obtaining information from medical records are
contained in AR 40-66.” Recent changes to AR 40-66 occurred in 2008 that
allow for disclosure of medical records when a soldier is accused of suicidal
behavior. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 40-66 ¶ 2-4 a.(2)(a), Medical Record
Administration and Healthcare Documentation (2010), available at
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r40_66.pdf.
For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Flynn-Brown, supra note 3.
Joshua Flynn-Brown & Kyndra Miller Rotunda, The Air Force Grounds Its
Officers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB10001424052970204224604577030221768840762.
Id.; Mark Thompson, Air Force: Firing for Effect?, TIME (Jan. 2, 2012),
http://nation.time.com/2012/01/03/air-force-firing-for-effect/.
See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1068 (citing and discussing H.R. REP. NO.
96-1462, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333, 6343).
Id.
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or engaging in misconduct that results in a letter of reprimand or nonjudicial punishment.70
Regarding the termination of the 157 officers, the Secretary of the
Air Force instructed the selective continuation board to apply only a
five year protective window instead of the six year protective window
provided by law. 71 This meant that Majors who had at least fifteen
years in service were allowed to continue their careers, but those with
fourteen years in service (contrary to the governing law and
regulations) could not, regardless of whether the officers had
derogatory information in their personnel files.72 In fact, many of the
157 did not have derogatory information in their records and were
exemplary officers.73 Their careers were cut short when they were very
near retirement and rightfully within the protective window.
Consequently, the Air Force unlawfully denied these Officers their
retirement pensions and medical benefits.74 Why would the Air Force
do such a thing? Terminating these personnel allows the Air Force to
avoid its normal retirement obligations. Yes, the Air Force’s
motivation is the prosaic one of saving money by breaking promises to
it military pilots.
The Secretary of the Air Force’s unilateral decision to narrow the
protective window from six years to five years raises several difficult
legal questions. A most significant question is whether there is any
room within existing law that would allow the Secretary to do this.
Related to that is the question of whether the Secretary of the Air
Force abused whatever discretion the law allows. Additionally, this
retroactive change in the interpretation of the regulation raises the
issue of whether the Air Force Officers have any legal claims
stemming from their reasonable expectation that they could continue
in service after serving for at least fourteen years and reaching the rank
of Major.
What follows is a brief analysis and discussion of the governing
law as it applies to this unusual situation. Ultimately, this Article
70
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Id. at 1077 & n.66.
The Selective Continuation Board considers promotion and retention of Officers
whom the Air Force has “passed over” for promotion, i.e., declined to promote.
See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1069.
Id.
Flynn-Brown & Rotunda, supra note 67; Thompson, supra note 68.
Flynn-Brown & Rotunda, supra note 67; Thompson, supra note 68.
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concludes the following: that the applicable federal law and governing
regulations are clear and thus leave no room for an alternative
interpretation; that the Secretary acted unilaterally and without
authority; and that terminating these Officers, contrary to the Air
Force’s written policy, violated their Constitutional property rights by
denying them continued employment and violated their Constitutional
procedural rights by failing to afford them a meaningful opportunity to
be heard before their employment with the Air Force was terminated.
A. Governing Statutes and Regulations
The Military is not required to follow the provisions of the
Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA), which protects civilian
retirement benefits and requires employers to provide some percentage
of vested pension benefits after anywhere from three to seven years of
employment.75 Military retirement benefits do not vest at seven years,
as would ordinarily occur in the civilian system. However, so long as
the officers promote to the rank of Major and serve on active duty for
at least fourteen years, something similar to vesting occurs. Military
Regulations provide a safe harbor that allows officers to continue their
military service until they have completed at least twenty years of
active duty military service and are eligible for retirement. 76
Essentially, it protects them from being terminated without benefits on
the eve of retirement.
Federal law, specifically The Defense Officers Personnel
Management Act (DOPMA), 77 broadly governs personnel and
promotion activities of officers within the Armed Services.
Annotations from the floor debate at the time it was enacted in 1980
make clear that Congress intended to soften the rigid “up or out”
policy of the Military by providing some expectation of continued
employment after officers attained a certain rank and number of years
in service. The House of Representatives Report to the Committee on
Armed Services explains and interprets DOPMA by stating that an
75
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For a general discussion, and comparison to military benefits model, see Joshua
Flynn-Brown & Joel Marrero, For Those Who Protect Us, Fair Retirement
Regulations Are In Order, L. A. DAILY J., Feb. 22, 2012.
See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1068 (citing and discussing H.R. REP. NO.
96-1462, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333, 6343).
Id. at 1074.
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, Pub. L. No. 96-513, 94 Stat. 2835
(1980).
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officer “on attaining permanent O-4 grade, has a career expectation of
twenty years in service” and after competing twenty years “is eligible
for immediate retirement.” 78 The same report also makes clear that
budget or financial constraints were not a “principal aim.”79
The notion of a safe harbor for Officers reaching the rank of Major
who have served at least fourteen years in service is further reflected in
Department of Defense Instructions and Military Regulations, which
explicitly guarantee that Majors who are within six years of retirement
ordinarily will be continued on active duty, stating, “Commissioned
officers on the Active Duty List who hold the grade of O-4 [Major],
who are subject to discharge . . . shall normally be selected for
continuation . . . if the officer will qualify for retirement within six
years of the date of such continuation.”80 The only stated exception to
this rule is when derogatory information exists in an Officer’s
personnel file.81
Until recently, every branch of the Military, including the Air
Force, has interpreted DOPMA and relevant Department of Defense
Instructions as providing a protective window that begins at the
fourteenth year in service. 82 In fact, Army regulations specifically
mandate the continuation of Majors with at least fourteen years in
service.83 It was not until recently that the Air Force, and specifically
Air Force Secretary Donnelly, unilaterally changed the protective
window from six years to five years. That is, had the 157 Air Force
Officers joined the Army fourteen years ago—or any other branch of
service except for their Air Force—they would have been allowed to
remain in Military service and earn a full retirement. It is clear that the
Air Force acted capriciously in treating these Officers disparately.
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See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1068 (citing and discussing H.R. REP. NO.
96-1462, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333, 6343).
Id. at 1074.
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1462, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333,
6343.
See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1077 n.66.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1072 & n.36 (citing DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DA MEMO 600-2, POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY LIST OFFICER SELECTION BOARDS app. C, § C2(a) (2006)).
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Interestingly, after the case involving the 157 Air Force Officers
received significant media attention, 84 the Department of Defense
amended its Instruction, and adjusted the six year window down to a
four year window.85 However, this does not change the fact that the
Air Force violated its own Instructions that existed at the time. 86
Changing the Instruction after the fact does not cure the legal violation
at the time; it only exacerbates the problem. If the Air Force Secretary
already enjoyed wide discretion, why change the Instruction at all?
B. Supreme Court Precedent and the Application of Perry v.
Sinderman
The plight of the terminated Airmen is analogous to a case that the
Supreme Court decided several years ago which supports the
proposition that what the Air Force has done is unconstitutional—
taking away a property interest without paying just compensation. The
case, Perry v. Sinderman, involved a college professor whose
employment contract was not renewed by the college where he
worked. 87 Professor Sinderman served as a professor for ten years.
During his last four years of employment, he served under a series of
one year contracts. 88 The college then decided not to renew his
contract but failed to provide an explanation for its refusal. 89 The
college claimed that it had virtually no duty or obligation to the
professor.90
Professor Sinderman disagreed, claiming that the college had
created something of a de facto tenure system based on peculiar
wording in its Faculty Handbook which stated, “The Administration of
the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent
84
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See Flynn-Brown & Rotunda, supra note 67; Thompson, supra note 68;
Caroline May, Military Advocates Decry Illegal Terminations, THE DAILY
CALLER (Nov. 25, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/11/25/military-advocatesdecry-illegal-early-terminations-of-157-air-force-majors/#!; Caroline May, US
Air Force Face Litigation for Illegal Termination of 157 Officers, THE DAILY
CALLER (Dec. 2, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/12/02/us-air-force-faceslitigation-for-illegal-termination-of-157-officers/.
Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1079.
Id.
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 594–95 (1972).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
Id.
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tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory[,] as long as he
displays a cooperative attitude . . . and as long as he is happy in his
work.”91
Professor Sinderman bolstered his argument by relying on
guidelines enacted by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College
and University System which guaranteed that teachers employed in the
state or university system for seven years or more have some form of
job tenure.92 The Board’s guidelines defined tenure as “assurance to an
experienced faculty member that he may expect to continue in his
academic position unless adequate cause for dismissal is
demonstrated.”93
The Supreme Court agreed with Professor Sinderman and rejected
the notion that only a rigid, technical form would bind the college.94
The Court found that Professor Sinderman did have a property interest
in continued employment based on “existing rules and understandings”
that were generally expressed in the Faculty Handbook and in the
Texas University System’s guidelines regarding tenure. 95 The Court
found that Mr. Sinderman had a property interest in reemployment
based on the implied contract between Mr. Sinderman and the
college.96 Even though the college did not have a formal tenure plan,
the Court agreed that the college may have created such a system in
practice.97 The Court said that these employment guarantees came in
the form of explicit guarantees, such as the employer’s handbook, and
implicit guarantees, such as the words and conduct by college officials
and administrators, which could have led Professor Sinderman to
reasonably believe that his job was secure.98
C. Sinderman Applied to Recent Air Force Terminations
One may argue that a case arising in an academic context should
not bind the U.S. Military. However, later cases make clear that the
91
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Id. at 600.
Id.
Id. at 600 n.6.
Id. at 601 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id.
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holding in Sinderman applies to cases arising in the military context.99
The Air Force may also have created legally binding obligations of
continued employment to its Officers through implicit and explicit
guarantees of continued employment.
For example, Air Force Publications explicitly guaranteed
continued employment to Majors serving at least fourteen years in
service. The Air Force’s Commissioning Kit, which the Air Force
provides to all Reserve Officer Training Corps Candidates, states,
“Majors and above who are not selected for promotion are continued
on active duty until eligible for retirement or up to 20 years for
Majors . . . . However, in order to reduce overmanning, special boards
can select some officers for early retirement.” 100 This language
explicitly guarantees continued employment for Majors with at least
fourteen years in service until they are eligible for retirement, except in
cases of overmanning, which would result in the Officer receiving an
early retirement. The stated policy does not suggest, or even
contemplate, that the Air Force would simply terminate Officers,
leaving them with no retirement or long term medical benefits. In fact,
it states the opposite. Officers could not have predicted that the Air
Force would cut short their careers without benefits because the Air
Force had explicitly said otherwise.
Further, the Officers in this instant case received e-mail
communications from the Air Force’s Personnel Office advising them
that “based on precedent” they would be continued on active duty
because they had at least fourteen years in service.101 At first, the Air
Force acted consistently with this precedent. The Air Force had
already issued orders for these officers to move to their next duty
assignments. 102 In some cases, the Air Force had already moved
99
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See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1073 (citing Yamashita v. England, No. 025176, 2002 WL 31898182 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2002); Guerra v. Scruggs, 942
F.2d 270 (4th Cir. 1991); Pauls v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 457 F.2d 294 (1st Cir.
1972); Spadone v. McHugh, 842 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.D.C. 2012); Wilhelm v.
Caldera, 90 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d, 6 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1071 & n.31 (citing and discussing AIR
FORCE ROTC CURRICULUM SECTION, TICKET: THE INITIAL COMMISSIONING KIT
OF ESSENTIAL TRUTHS 42 (1996)).
See id. at 1071 n.32 (“[T]he implicit understandings included promises by
personnel command counselors that officers within six years of retirement
would be continued on active duty.”).
See id.
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Officers’ household goods to new location assignments, when the Air
Force unexpectedly and abruptly announced that the Airman would
not be moving to another assignment but instead would be
terminated.103
In another instance, the Officer—a Pilot who had flown 269
combat missions104—was on his way to Iraq when he learned that the
Air Force was terminating his employment. 105 Not only did the Air
Force explicitly guarantee continued employment, it initially acted in
accordance with that guarantee, to the detrimental reliance of military
families.
D. Policy Implications
Why does it matter? After all, these officers had received pay and
benefits for at least fourteen years while they served. It matters
because of the Military’s all-or-nothing retirement system. Unless
service members serve at least eighteen years, they receive neither a
retirement pension nor benefits. Many of these families detrimentally
relied on explicit and implicit promises made to them by the Air Force.
The loss to these military families is significant. Furthermore, these
terminations without pension and without medical benefits violated the
law and may also have violated Constitutional provisions protecting
property interests and guaranteeing due process of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is ironic that sometimes the Military is the primary contributor to
problems faced by service members. This Article is based on two
cases, which are currently being litigated. Both cases clearly
demonstrate instances in which the Military opts for interpretations of
its own rules and regulations to the detriment of service members,
even when other interpretations are available that are more aligned
with its own precedent. It is well known that suicide and
unemployment are growing problems facing our Military personnel,
but many people would be surprised to learn that the Military itself
creates the very problems it complains about. One wonders whether
103
104
105

See id.
Thompson, supra note 68.
Id. (“Major Kale Mosley was getting ready to board his KC-135 refueling tanker
for Iraq last June when a commander pulled him aside. He was being
fired . . . .”).
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the Band of Brothers (and Sisters) exists in today’s U.S. Military, or
whether it is an ideal of the distant past.

